continuous with the primitive animism whose answer to the problem of X was the theory of the ghost-soul.

The vital force of the physiologists was thus a sort of truncated or impoverished psyche, a psyche deprived of its mental powers and restricted to those of the vegetative level, with perhaps something of the second or animal level of psychic functions distinguished by Plato- and Aristotle. Vitalism thus became a kind of timid and much-restricted variety of animism. And it was really much inferior to a thorough-going animism; for the latter, postulating an active soul, was able to learn by means of introspection something about the nature of the intelligent and purposive activities which, by the postulate, were ascribed to the psyche; and thus was able in some degree to make of it a valid explanatory hypothesis founded in empirical observations. Whereas of the vital force, on the contrary, nothing could be learnt and nothing could be said, save only that it must be supposed to be the agent that accomplishes whatever in the living body cannot be explained in terms of physics and chemistry.

In modern controversy it is very usual among the critics of vitalism to assume that vitalism consists essentially in the postulation of a, or the, vital force. It is then easy to pour scorn upon the vitalist by pointing out the quite empty, almost meaningless nature of the term * vital force '. This, however, is not fair dealing. It is one form of that argumentation by way of

innuendo and abuse of one's opponents which in this sphere is so common and so much to be deplored.

The proper usage of the word * vitalism ' is, I submit, as the class designation for all forms of the answer to the problem of X which assume that the distinctive